It is true, of course, that a local civil rights commission is not an agency under the IAPA and thus the IAPA is not directly applicable. The fact that a local civil rights commission is not explicitly subject to chapter 17A, however, is not determinative on the issue here. For example, under the Davenport ordinance, a litigant has rights and responsibilities that are parallel to those provided by the contested case provisions of chapter 17A, including the right to notice, to counsel, and to an evidentiary hearing. As a result, we conclude that this local proceeding amounts to “a contested case conducted according to the provisions of chapter 17A.” Under Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(f), the commission acted lawfully when it conducted closed meetings to deliberate in this matter.
The precise question is whether the proceedings in this case before the commission were conducted “according to the provisions of chapter 17A,” even if chapter 17A did not expressly govern the matter. of County Comm'rs, 108 Idaho 728, 701 P.2d 1293, 1295 (1985) (finding the phrase “in accordance” did not require a zoning ordinance to be an exact copy of the master plan, but rather required the ordinance to reflect the goals of the plan in light of all the facts and circumstances); Holmgren v. We next turn to the question of whether the otherwise lawful closed deliberations violate Botsko's right to procedural due process of law. W.2d 804, 806-07 (Iowa 1993) (noting the strong public policy reasons to avoid inquiry into mental processes of administrative decisionmakers). Botsko also challenges the role of Director Morrell in this proceeding as violating procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution.
After affirmances at the district court and court of appeals, we granted further review to consider: (1) whether the district court erred in affirming the commission's award of attorneys' fees and in awarding Nabb additional attorneys' fees on appeal, (2) whether the district court erred in affirming the commission's holding that it was authorized to hold closed deliberative sessions, and (3) whether the district court erred in rejecting Botsko's procedural due process claim. An administrative law judge (ALJ) originally issued a proposed decision in favor of Botsko. Nabb conversely argues that Botsko misinterprets the ordinance. W.2d 529, 536-37 (Iowa 1980), where we held that a statutory provision authorizing an award of attorneys' fees related to district court proceedings did not imply that attorneys' fees on appeal could also be recovered. The local ordinance in this case fails to meet this test. Ed.2d 712, 723 (1975) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.
The commission found for Nabb, awarding her compensatory and emotional distress damages and attorneys' fees and costs. Nabb filed a complaint alleging that her employer, Botsko, maintained a hostile work environment and constructively discharged her from employment. did not specifically authorize an award of attorneys' fees, but instead provided only that parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings before the commission “at their own expense.” Davenport Mun. He asserts that in the absence of a statutory provision authorizing attorneys' fees, a party has no right to recover attorneys' fees as part of a damages award. Instead, the question is whether the ordinance enacted by the City of Davenport at the time of this proceeding contained an express provision clearly authorizing an award of attorneys' fees.
She further asserts there was no evidence that Morrell prosecuted the case, noting that under the ordinance, the duties and power of the director do not include prosecution. Nabb argues the undisputed evidence shows that Morrell had no vote in the deliberative process, did not tell anyone how to vote, and did not try to influence anyone's vote.
For instance, the mere knowledge or participation of an adjudicatory fact finder in a preliminary investigation does not taint the proceedings when there is a later evidentiary hearing before the agency on the merits of the case. The law is fiercely protective of the deliberative process of multi-member bodies in order to promote candid and uninhibited discussion which produces the give-and-take that is the hallmark of effective collective decisionmaking. The second challenge goes to Morrell's alleged role as an advocate for Nabb at the administrative hearing and in presenting a joint brief to this court. Nabb counters Botsko's arguments by asserting that a paralegal, and not Morrell personally, investigated the case and made a recommendation to Morrell after completing her investigation. She additionally asserts that Botsko failed to show actual bias sufficient to overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity by persons who serve as adjudicators. Rptr.3d 585, 145 P.3d 462, 464 (2006); State ex rel. Such combinations inhere in the very nature of the administrative process before an agency. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 40 Cal.4th 1, 50 Cal.
A party in an administrative proceeding is entitled to procedural due process.